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Barely eight months have passed since Hungary’s new
Parliament met – and since then the words and deeds
of the party and new government have turned the
political life and the workings of the state and the
economy upside down. We are constantly perplexed;
we have not even recovered from our astonishment at
yesterday’s political measure when today’s new
announcement or measure arrives. It is hard to stay
upright in the whirlwind of events and absorb their
import. Let us stop for a moment, take a deep breath,
and reconsider what has actually happened. Let us try
to form a comprehensive picture of the change out of
the hundreds of fragmentary details. What has hap-
pened to this country in so short a time?
It would call for a different study to cover how the
country had arrived at the situation it was in when the
new government took over. The questions of who,
which political figure, which party, which interest
group bore responsibility, and to what degree, or an
account of the previous political and economic
processes cannot be included here. This paper consid-
ers only what the new party and its government that
took over in the spring of 2010 has done so far.
I will cover eight fields – areas that may suffice to
identify the most important changes. I have not aimed
at new discoveries; in discussing each field, I am join-
ing in with those who have likewise been examining it,
probably in greater detail than I have. My aim is a
summary, an overview of where we stand.
Democracy
In the period of 1989–1990 and the summer of 2010,
Hungary was a democracy. It is no longer one now –
the political formation today is an autocracy. This
statement will make full sense only if I outline what I
mean by democracy, the more so as the term has been
defined in several different ways. The East European
version of the socialist system was dubbed in its offi-
cial ideology as ‘people’s democracy’, while the formal
‘bourgeois’ democracy of the West was denounced as
a sham. Those in power today are claiming that their
type of rule is the true embodiment of democracy.
However, it is not on a basis of claims or aspirations
(‘let the people rule’) that my definition of the term
rests, but on the observation of actual practices. Let
us take the set of countries usually termed developed
democracies, including those of Western Europe and
North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
Which are the common features that actually mani-
fest themselves in them? The question is not whether
those features are codified in a constitution or are
based on tradition or historical conventions. What
counts is the practical application of those features in
a democracy.
The essential features are the following:
￿ Powers are strictly separated.
￿ Certain important governmental tasks are fulfilled
by bodies independent of the government.
￿ There is a clear line separating a rather small group
of political appointees from a large group of civil
servants and public sector employees whose jobs
are independent of, and uninterrupted by, the
political changes.
￿ The principle of checks and balances is applied.
No branch of power or organization of state is
allowed to prevail for a long time, as the other
branches and organizations prevent it.
￿ The enactments of bills by the Parliament are pre-
ceded by extensive prior debates and negotiations,
followed by thorough, and therefore time-consum-
ing, debates about each in the Parliament. In some
countries the process of prior negotiations is con-
trolled by law, but the democratic political culture
is even stronger force than the word of law in
applying the requirements of prior discussions and
negotiations and careful and responsible parlia-
mentary debate.
* Collegium Budapest – Institute for Advanced Study. This is an
English translation of the article ‘SZÁMVETÉS’ published in the 
6 January 2011 issue of NÉPSZABADSÁG.It is almost unbelievable what deep wounds have
already been inflicted on the face of democracy and
how many of the essential features installed in the
past twenty years have been marred by the Orbán gov-
ernment and their party, Fidesz:
￿ Everything is decided in the ‘central field of
power’.
￿ The practice of widespread debate and negotiation
before the introduction of new legislation has
ceased. Parliament has been converted into a vot-
ing machine that turns out laws on an assembly
line at incredible speed.
￿ The post of Hungary’s head of state, the
President of the Republic, is no longer held by a
personality who stands above parties and embod-
ies unity of the nation, but by a willing, obedient
party devotee.
￿ The key office of Chief Prosecutor has been filled
by a tried supporter of the ruling party.
￿ The National Elections Commission, whose task is
to oversee elections, was replaced before its term
expired, by a new committee composed almost
exclusively of Fidesz supporters.
￿ The powers of the Constitutional Court, the chief
guardian of constitutionalism and the fundamen-
tal office of judicial independence, were brutally
restricted – a step that dealt in itself is a fatal blow
on the principle of checks and balances.
￿ When the independent Fiscal Council dared to
criticize government plans, it was dissolved. It was
not an independent and distinguished professional
expert who was appointed to head the State Audit
Office, but a faithful member of the ruling political
group. Also exerted at that time was the right to
appoint the president and the two vice-presidents
of the Competition Authority.
￿ It is natural with a change of government that new
people should be appointed to such leading state
offices as are usually filled by political appointees.
But what actually happened was a political cleans-
ing far beyond that, so that the principle of a
standing civil service with relative independence
from politics was denied. Now a new law makes it
possible to lay off central or local governmental
officials and employees without explanation. There
is an atmosphere of fear and subservience forming
among those working for the state apparatus, due
to the threatening statements being made by lead-
ing politicians.
The ultimate test of democracy is the procedure fol-
lowed when removing a person, group or party in
power. The fundamental criterion of a democracy is
lack of violence: no murder of tyrants, no military
coups d’état, no secret camarilla conspiracies, no vio-
lent crowd demonstrations to force out those in
power; no bloody uprising or revolution is required.
It is possible to carry out the transfer of power in a
peaceful and civilized way, through elections
between rival parties. As in other tests, the results
can be decided only after the event. A posteriori it
can be stated that the Hungarian political structure
passed the removability test between 1990 and the
spring 2010 elections, for Hungarian voters removed
several previous governments and elected a new ones
in clean elections.
It should be noted that this does not necessarily
entail automatic alternation. The question is not
whether the change happens at every single election,
but whether the removal is possible or not. Has the
present political leadership ‘barricaded itself in’ to a
degree that leaves no likelihood of their removal?
Such cases are not confined to totalitarian regimes,
e.g. Nazi or communist dictatorships. They occur
also in autocracies like the Horthy regime in
Hungary between the two world wars. In that long
historical period the Parliament had regular ses-
sions, there were legal opposition parties, several
parties stood in the elections – but the state and the
political sphere were so organized as to secure auto-
matic success for the governing political group in
each and every election of the Horthy period. The
political order guaranteed the immovability of the
governing power.
It would be too early (and too disheartening) to state
whether this is already the case in present-day
Hungary. It would be too early even if Fidesz won
again at the next elections. It will only be possible to
establish the results of the final procedural test of
removability after a long historical period. What can
be said today is that Viktor Orbán declared even
before the elections that the political situation had to
be organized in a way that would ensure them power
for at least 15  –20 years. Since taking power, they have
made irreversible steps toward realizing that plan.
They have destroyed or severely weakened the institu-
tions to ensure the principle of removability. And let
me add, they have not exhausted all the possibilities in
this short period. I would not like to suggest ideas, for
they know them anyway: gerrymandering election
boundaries, introducing election laws that decrease
the chances of rival parties, giving Hungarians domi-
ciled abroad the right to vote, etc. 
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Free press
An independent and free press is usually given promi-
nence among the political checks and balances. The
press is often called the fourth branch of power in
democracies, additional to the legislative, executive
and judiciary. It is indispensible in ensuring that the
government should not feel secure in possessing
unlimited and uncontrollable power. A free press can
reveal the abuses of those in power and peek behind
the political scenes. If political announcements are
misleading or silent on important facts, the free press
can expose the truth.
The new media regulations, i.e. the institutional reor-
ganization of the media authority and the passage of
the Media Act, produces a level of centralization in
the world of public media and political communica-
tion comparable only to the propaganda machine of
a communist dictatorships. The head of the media
authority has the power to issue decrees, and the
body can levy financial penalties. It is entitled to con-
trol not only the state-owned media, but the private-
ly owned media, not only television and radio, but
the printed press, internet portals and blogs. The
body, exclusively made up of Fidesz delegates, regu-
lates the allocation of television and radio frequen-
cies, where rejection of an application marks the end
of an applicant television or radio company. Private
media owners may shy away from criticism of the
government not only because of the possible rejec-
tion of an application to renew their operating license
or the threat of a crippling fine, but also because
advertising from companies close to the central field
of power may dry up.
The war over the free press is far from over, but the
first battle has been won by the Orbán government.
Even if they have not enforced their new rules, the
sheer possibility has an intimidating effect. There will
certainly be brave people (there are already some) who
bear the risk heroically. But there is every reason to
fear that several media owners, editors and journal-
ists, even if otherwise ready to criticize the govern-
ment, will prefer to watch their words or stay silent,
applying self-censorship. The programs on public tele-
vision and radio have already become skewed: some
important news items (those ones awkward to the
authorities) are not being broadcast or being present-
ed as insignificant, and no fair coverage is being given
to opposing opinions. And this is only the beginning,
for the new ‘Media Tzar’ and her apparatus have not
started open retaliation.
The state of law
Fidesz gained power in a legal and valid way, and it
has complied with the law in most of its actions. So
legality rules in a narrow sense. But the description
must continue: if a law in force is in its way, the gov-
ernment changes it. If it wants to make an exception
for a favored person or group, it tailors the law to
ensure them that privilege. If the law the authorities
introduce conflicts with the Constitution, they amend
it (as they have done no less than ten times). And if
the Constitution, with its multitude of impromptu
amendments, is still in their way, they will sweep it
away and impose a new one on the country. In more
than one case so far they trickily circumvented the
law, for example by taking a bill onto an MP’s motion
to circumvent legally compulsory negotiation process-
es. Moreover, they openly flout Hungarian and EU
regulations, the Constitution and the basic require-
ments of a state of law in significant matters. In one
unprecedented case, they re-enacted a retroactive law
that had been nullified by the Constitutional Court by
curbing the latter’s powers.
The principle of a state of law – Rechtsstaatprinzip –
is a wide and complex concept that it would be diffi-
cult to define it in any mathematically precise way, but
a democrat will sense the spirit of such a state of law.
It means respect for the Constitution and the laws in
force, even if they were not enacted by those now in
power. A state of law means that legal security
applies, that citizens are assured their rights by the
state, that those rights are stable and long-lasting, and
that they cannot be curtailed on the impulse or at the
whim of political decision-makers.
Using the term ‘state of law’ in this wider sense, I
would not like to go to the lengths of saying that
Hungary no longer is a state of law. Important legal
guarantees have been destroyed in the past few
months, including first of all the crude attack on the
Constitutional Court. The new political leadership
has publicly tried to instruct prosecutors or to sum-
mon judges before the Parliament. Still, we fortunate-
ly cannot claim that the independence of judges has
been eliminated, or that politically relevant verdicts
are actually being dictated by a group of politicians
for judges to sign. The practice in the coming years
will tell how far judicial independence continues, or is
eradicated and becomes an empty formality. There
will be worries about the future activity of the police
and the public prosecutors’ offices as far as their prac-
tice of investigating and charging politically relatedcases are concerned. These worries are justified by
several previous bitter experiences: cases may be
hushed up when they are awkward to those in govern-
ment, or handled with bias when the suspects are the
opponents of those in power. We will see – let us hope
these worries turn out to be unsubstantiated.
Capitalism
Having reviewed the political field, let us consider
the economy. The capitalist system prevails in
Hungary. I am convinced it will continue to do so
throughout the Orbán government, and survive the
present political regime. Capitalism is a particularly
tough and robust system. The historical example of
the socialist system proves that however strong capi-
talism may be, it is possible to abolish it in a country
or group of countries, and replace it by another
viable system. However, this can only be achieved
with an iron will, by eliminating private property,
and replacing it everywhere (or almost everywhere)
by state property; by eliminating market coordina-
tion (or keeping only fragments of it), and replacing
it by bureaucratic coordination in every section of
the economy. Those presently in power have not
done so, and there are no signs pointing in that direc-
tion for the future. Even if there are similarities
between Bolshevik parties and the present-governing
group in their style of government, Fidesz is obvi-
ously not a Marxist-Leninist party. It does not have
a policy of eradicating capitalism. 
People frequently have illusions about the efficiency
of the capitalist system. Its sheer existence is often
believed to guarantee efficient allocation and utiliza-
tion of resources. That, however, is certainly not the
case. While some capitalist economies are highly effi-
cient, others struggle along with a lot of friction.
Far from aiming to eradicate capitalism, the Orbán
regime is linked to it by multiple strands and enjoys
the support of some big-business oligarchs and many
small-business entrepreneurs. It is ready to exchange
political and economic support for economic and
political support. At the same time, the regime’s inter-
ventions in the economy keep throwing sand in the
works. The anti-capitalist slogans of its public
rhetoric do damage to the economy, but much more is
done by their actions. The economic policy of the past
eight months has decreased the efficiency of
Hungarian capitalism, weakened it, and reduced its
development chances.
The socialist system is centralized by nature; state
property and the dominance of bureaucratic coordi-
nation allow centralized command. But not even that
system could make headway by voluntarism, the fal-
lacy that the dictator and his group could achieve any-
thing just by wanting it enough. There is a similar vol-
untarism apparent in the Orbán government’s actions.
But though they may widen the sphere of state inter-
ference and intervene in economic processes in a more
aggressive way, we will still live in a capitalist econo-
my. Market rules are in operation. Economic agents in
Hungary and abroad have wills of their own. Sellers
and service providers cannot be forced to sell or pro-
vide services, neither can financial investors be forced
to buy government bonds, or investors to create real
capital. Even the most aggressive government, over a
longer period, is unable to impose its will on the econ-
omy in every aspect. And the more unscrupulously a
government tries to do so, the more stubborn the
backlash will become, and the more damage will be
caused to the development of the economy.
Private property
The edifice of the capitalist system is founded on pri-
vate property. Looking at real historical practice
instead of theoretical models, it will be seen that pri-
vate property has never been the exclusive type in any
capitalist economy, other types having also been pre-
sent, but private property has been the dominant type,
and respect for private property is integral to it: it
must be present in the regulations and in the value
judgments of public opinion.
What has happened recently in Hungary to private
pensions funds seriously undermines trust in the gov-
ernment’s respect for private property. That trust
could be maintained if a pension reform led to accu-
mulated wealth handled as private property shrinking,
and savings managed by the state growing, provided
that the changes were based on the principle of vol-
untary choice. That would be the case if following
conditions are satisfied: (i) the active employees faced
a genuine choice between different alternatives,
including a return from the private to the public pen-
sion scheme; (ii) they changed of their own free will,
based on information that evaluated the advantages
and disadvantages; and (iii) they had sufficient time
for consideration. But that is not what is happening.
There have been vague, fuzzy promises instead of ade-
quate information, hectic rush instead of fair time to
consider, and threats and severe discrimination
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instead of a free choice. Those remaining with the pri-
vate pension funds will partly or wholly lose their
rights to a state pension (the loss ratio being depen-
dent on a range of factors). In the midst of self-con-
tradictory official announcements and shallow or
downright false information, i.e. in state of confusion,
members of the private pension funds are being
forced to make crucial decisions that will essentially
influence their financial position in old age. 
The whole procedure raises sad memories for the his-
torically experienced older generations. The agricul-
tural cooperative movement fits in well with capital-
ism so long as there are farmers with full control over
their own private property volunteering to cooperate.
That applies even though cooperative ownership dif-
fers from private ownership. But the aim of those who
confiscated the lands of Hungarian farmers and
forced them into cooperatives in the 1950s and 1960s
was precisely to eradicate capitalism in the country-
side. Those who dreamed up and implemented the
present-day pension reform cannot be accused of
wanting to eradicate capitalism. What they have done,
however, seriously damages the principles of capital-
ism, and is not far short of crude confiscation.
Growth and development
The stated economic policy of Fidesz and the gov-
ernment centers on enhancing growth. Hardly an
economist would disagree that lasting growth is the
key to the well-being and development of a society.
But growth paths can be of diverse natures, each
with different characteristics, as every economist will
admit. It is also generally agreed that the govern-
ment can employ varied methods to increase growth,
each differing in their outcomes and side-effects.
Whether growth should be the central question of
the economic policy is not worth arguing now. The
real issue is what type of growth to promote and by
what methods.
Analysts would be in an easier position if they could
see clearly what the government was really planning
to do now, next year, in the following years, or in
15–20 years’ time – the span of office they plan for
themselves. Their oral announcements are full of
empty phrases, wild promises with no deadlines, and
self-contradictory ideas. What is even more dangerous
is that their first definite, figure-based ‘statement of
intent’, the 2011 state budget, does not state clearly,
either, what the government is planning to do. Thus
no coherent economic policy is decipherable from the
announcements of leading politicians or from the
2011 state budget. Practical regulations are not being
introduced after thorough professional debates, care-
ful consideration of short and long-term effects, or
comparison of alternative solutions. A sadly low level
of professionalism has seeped into the creation of the
economic policy. Without a coherent plan to analyze
in a consistent and intellectually rigorous way, I am
confined to raising a few questions left vague, and to
refute a few misleading statements.
When the topic is discussed, we keep hearing a single
declaration: taxes will be lowered, and that will give
an impetus for growth. However, the many studies
that have sought to clarify the causal connection
between tax reduction and growth have certainly not
reached unambiguous conclusions. We do not know
exactly how much GDP increment one million forints’
tax reduction will produce, or when it will do so, after
how much delay. But those one million forints will cer-
tainly be missing from the revenue side of the state
budget, and the deficit will have to be balanced either
by expenditure reduction (through austerity measures,
in spite of recurrent promises to the contrary), or by
loans (in which case what will happen to government
debt reduction, another loud promise?) So overall
reduction of the taxes imposed on society is not the
real plan. Instead it is a question of tax burdens being
reallocated. In the absence of careful calculations, we
do not know the answer to an embarrassing question.
Even if certain tax reductions do result in the growth
of total demand and that does generates additional
output, will not the loss caused to long-term growth
by the reallocation of taxes be greater? True, the
household sector (especially well-to-do households)
will pay less tax, but business sectors hit by the ‘crisis
taxes’ will pay more. The consequences, however, do
not stop at this point, but spill over into other areas.
Sectors hit by the crisis tax will transfer much of the
burden onto their customers: other companies and
the household sector. Their profits may truly decrease,
but that will have a backlash, as their profits are a
major source of their investments. The disproportion-
ately severe tax burden can be expected to have a deep
impact on the short, mid and long-term business poli-
cies of some key branches of the financial, produc-
tion, and trade sectors. The capitalist economy is
unable to operate and develop in the long run without
a flexible, pro-active, effective credit system. The
unacceptably severe tax burden on the banking sector,
introduced to spare individual taxpayers, will not hit
‘rich bankers’, but will slow down the active flow ofthe economy. We should not listen only to the banks’
public complaints. We should also notice what is hap-
pening in the day-to-day activity of the financial sec-
tor: that they have already started restricting the cred-
it supply, although credit is needed more than ever.
All the sectors involved in the crisis tax are restricting
their investment activities, and this will eventually put
a brake on lasting growth.
Does the government wish labor productivity to grow
as fast as possible and technical development to flour-
ish in this country? Or does it rather want to maintain
or restore jobs due to be closed down by internation-
al or domestic competition? Is the main aim a rapid
increase in employment, or is an increase of produc-
tion, productivity and competitiveness the real main
aim? I am afraid some leading politicians and their
propagandists are unaware that these aims are contra-
dictory to a degree; one cannot go around believing
that ‘employment’, ‘growth’ and ‘development’ are
synonymous terms.
Are small and medium-sized enterprises the group of
producers destined to be given a competitive advan-
tage? All right, but then other producers will be dis-
advantaged. Or is it not some Hungarian oligarchs
close to governing circles who are to be preferred over
their competitors? Is it easier for a company ‘close’ to
governing circles to get a state contract than for a ‘dis-
tant’ company? Or should the competition run on
strictly equal terms?
The experience of economic history has shown
repeatedly that small countries are incapable of fast
and lasting growth if they are ‘inward-looking’, trying
to base growth on artificial acceleration of domestic
demand. Is the present government really ready to
give up on the well-tried and sound growth policy of
export-driven growth? Is the economic policy of sup-
porting sustainable growth more advantageous for the
nation, not one obscuring the idea of advantageous
adaptation to the international division of labor while
mouthing national slogans?
Some related questions can be raised about the finan-
cial resources of growth. Is the economic policy of
national isolationism and self-reliance to be followed
also in finding resources? Do they wish to achieve fast
growth with that policy? Though not advantageous, it
could be achieved in a country where the rate of sav-
ings is large, and people do not consume a huge frac-
tion of the new value produced by them. But nation-
al isolationism is no more than an arrogant, empty
slogan if the economy is ultimately dependent on
imports of capital. It is easy to observe that the fol-
lowing three requirements are in conflict: (i) a low
level of savings (i.e. a permanent release from the
responsibility for one’s future); (ii) large investment
needed for fast growth and technical development;
and (iii) exclusion of international capital. These
requirements are contradictory not only empirically,
but logically. Which is the one they really wish, and
which are only lip service?
Should Hungarian commercial chains be given pref-
erence over international chains? Should Hungarian
banks be given preference over international ones?
Opposition to ‘multinationals’ is being fomented. But
should the biggest Hungarian bank and the
Hungarian energy-sector mega-corporation be
allowed to become multinational themselves, taking
abroad and investing some of the profits they have
gained in Hungary?
The governing group wishes for growth within a mod-
ern capitalist system, so how could the expression
‘gambling on the stock exchange’ become a ubiqui-
tous pejorative term? ‘Private pension funds have
gambled away members’ money at the stock
exchange,’ says the government spokesperson, as if
the investment in stocks and bonds traded at the stock
exchange were not the normal, recommended, or to a
certain degree compulsory activity of every savings
institution. They speak as if stock exchange invest-
ment resembled a careless father gambling away the
family’s money at the racetrack, or a baron gambling
away a family estate at the casino. Can capitalism exist
without a stock exchange or other organizations of a
flexible capital market? If a company cannot raise
capital by issuing shares, how else can it do so?
Exclusively from bank loans? Or should it ask for
state subsidy?
Does the government make the most of the huge
opportunity of Hungary being a member of the
European Union, with the advantage of having struc-
tural transformation of the country supported by EU
financial resources? Or if that is their aim, why are
they delaying practical utilization of EU support?
Why do they keep getting into conflict with various
EU organizations, instead of listening to their advice
and learning from the criticism and warnings offered
in a reserved diplomatic style?
Organizers of present-day Hungarian economic poli-
cy like to call themselves Keynesians, but what they
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are doing can more accurately be termed a kind of
‘vulgar Keynesianism’. They seem to have half-
digested the theory of the great English economist,
and ignored the profound debate of decades among
the different schools of macroeconomics. Economic
policy inspired by Keynes certainly includes the rec-
ommendation that economic growth should be given
an impetus, greatly needed in times of recession and
depression, by increasing fiscal expenditure. The
train of thought also includes the idea, repeatedly
emphasized by the critics of Keynes based on several
painful historical experiences, that long-lasting fiscal
overspending carries the danger of inflation.
Unleashing inflation is too high a price to pay for
production growth!
Keynes, however, does not only emphasize such an
increase of demand by fiscal methods, but also the
optimism, investing spirit and expansion drive of
entrepreneurs as the engine of recovery, followed by
lasting growth – in Keynes’s oft-cited words, the ‘ani-
mal spirits’ that motivate the investors. But this opti-
mistic atmosphere and investing spirit is not stimulat-
ed, but on the contrary damped by the unpredictabil-
ity about when and how the principle of private prop-
erty is being damaged, when and how much tax is
being imposed on it, and when and why it is being dis-
criminated against.
Let me add that I am not talking only about the mood
of foreign investors, but of Hungarian investors too.
A wealthy taxpayer who has more to spend after the
introduction of the single-rate income tax will think
twice before investing that capital in the Hungarian
capital market (for example, by ‘gambling on the
stock exchange’ with it), buying Hungarian state
bonds and probably thus supporting state-financed
investments, rather than buying foreign securities,
depositing it in a foreign bank, or spending it on
domestic consumption. Every Hungarian company
will be concerned about how much to spend on self-
financed investment and how much to earmark for
dividends. The less predictable the country’s econom-
ic policy is and the more damage is done to private
property, the slower the domestic investment mood
can be expected to improve.
The economic profession has discussed extensively the
relationship between monetary stability, budgetary
balance, the balance of inflow and outflow of foreign
resources, the stability of the purchasing power, the
amount of admissible government debt, the level of
satisfactory foreign currency reserves on the one
hand, and the rate of growth on the other. Nowadays
the debate has become more emphatic, as every coun-
try is looking for methods to overcome the recession.
But a broad consensus has been achieved on the fol-
lowing idea: sustainable growth is gravely endangered
if there are serious troubles with the financial equilib-
rium of the economy. Those addressing this topic in a
responsible way cannot be reassured by the repeated
declarations of the government that the budget deficit
will not exceed the upper limit targeted for 2010 and
2011. That is a necessary, but not a sufficient condi-
tion for financial stability, especially not for a vulner-
able economy like ours. The promise of lasting growth
will be credible only if the government makes it clear
what economic policy it wishes to employ to sustain
financial equilibrium in the wider sense after 2011.
Unfortunately, the methods the government is plan-
ning to use to achieve the target deficit this year and
next year threaten to open a much wider gap between
state revenues and expenditure in later years, while
other types of troubles appear in other aspects of
financial equilibrium.
Distribution
Fidesz, in its election campaign, promised to avoid
restrictive austerity measures. Since then the official
propaganda machine has tried to give the impression
that the promise is being kept, that no restrictions
have been made or will be made in the future. But this
is only playing with words, cleverly exploiting the
vagueness in the concept of ‘restriction’. Let us put it
simply: the earlier decisions and announced plans of
the government actually will cause concrete losses of
real present and future consumption to some of the
people, decrease the value of their wealth and savings,
and increase their debt. The redistribution is continu-
al, causing continual rearrangement of the groups of
winners and losers, and change in the size and com-
position of their gains and losses. Those who have suf-
fered losses, or will suffer them in the future have
indeed been ‘restricted’, and a great many people
belong to that group.
So who have suffered the losses? Let me list only those
whose losses are certain, although others may well have
suffered them too. And of course there may be individ-
uals or families with multiple losses, who belong con-
currently to several of the groups listed below:
￿ The losers include those with low or medium
incomes (or more precisely, with income only fromemployment, earning above the minimum wage but
below 293,450 forints a month (approximately
1,100 euros or 1,400 US dollars), and with no
dependent children. Their net nominal income will
decrease due to changes in taxation and income
policy.
￿ The losers include those with a loan expressed in
foreign currency, as their debt has been increasing
due to the weakening forint exchange rate. For it
has been shown that there is a clear causal rela-
tionship between irresponsible statements of lead-
ing politicians, the announced economic policy of
the government, and uncertainties about the bud-
get for 2011 and onwards on the one hand, the
weakening of the forint on the other.
￿ The losers include households affected by the gas
price increase. The increase, long overdue, cannot
be sensibly opposed by any economist. It is repul-
sive, however, first to promise the contrary and
then to break it without as much as an admission
that the promise was irresponsible and unfeasible.
￿ The losers include producers, small and medium-
sized companies among them, which do not
export their products, yet use imported materials
and components, as their production costs have
grown and their sales been hit by the weakening
exchange rate.
￿ The losers include employees laid off without
explanation from jobs in state service, during a
process of purges and restructuring. 
￿ The losers include employees laid off from indus-
tries hit by the crisis taxes. Those industries are try-
ing to recoup costs by restructuring and rational-
ization, which means shedding staff and increasing
work loads on remaining employees.
￿ The losers include those unemployed who cannot
get another job due to the sluggish investment
climate. 
￿ The losers include those who have accumulated sav-
ings in the private pension funds. That real wealth is
being confiscated now, and contributors herded into
the state pension system, against unspecified pen-
sion promises for the distant future. 
￿ The losers include those selling their real estate. In
an already depressed market situation, their assets
continue to lose value as the government sets out to
speed up housing construction artificially, using
taxpayers’ money, at a time of strikingly conspicu-
ous excess supply. The loss of value intensifies the
problems of borrowers of foreign currency-based
loans for purchasing or building real estate. 
￿ The losers include consumers, who have shoul-
dered a significant part of the crisis tax burden.
That burden will be passed on whether the govern-
ment prohibits it or not, whether it is done by the
supplier/seller in an open or a concealed way.
￿ The losers include a high proportion of employees.
Wage negotiations are occurring right now. In sev-
eral spheres, agreements on nominal wages (shaped
in such a way that real wages should freeze) have
been settled in line with official inflation predic-
tions. Their real wages will fall if inflation proves
faster than that.
￿ The losers include all consumers hit by the acceler-
ating inflation. More definite statements about the
influence of the Orbán government’s economic
policy on consumer prices can only be made at the
end of 2011. Now we can consider only effects that
appear to be inflationary: the weakening national
currency, the rising interest rates on loans used to
finance the budget deficit and government debt,
and the increase in the tax burden on key branches
of the economy. Inflation is a levy that hits every-
one, but the effect is felt most by the poorest. The
impact of the government’s economic policy points
in the direction of an increase, and not a decrease
in inflation. Central bank monetary policy to com-
bat that danger has to face recurrent attacks from
the government’s side.
Apart from losers, there are winners as well. But the
losers are not consoled by the fact that others have
won. Losers will rightly deduce that ‘restrictive aus-
terity measures’ have occurred, but the screws of the
press are unevenly adjusted.
Fidesz in opposition happily made populist state-
ments and attacked economically useful but unpop-
ular measures, as champions of the poor. They often
sought to give the impression that they wanted to
combine the principles of right-wing ideology with a
neo-Kádárite economic policy. What has remained
of this now that Fidesz is in power? Only a few con-
spicuous gestures: early retirement for a certain cat-
egory of women (a move in the opposite direction to
the Europe-wide efforts to delay retirement) re-open-
ing a few railway feeder lines, instead of efforts to
reduce the operating losses of the railways. Mean  -
while two undoubtedly important moves have yet to
begin: change in the government financing of the
health care and education sectors. Nobody knows
whether future changes in these, labeled ‘structural
reform’, will really change present practice or not.
Let me emphasize that their present structures creat-
ed under the Kádár regime are still being main-
tained. 
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So while traces of Kádárism remain in Fidesz policy,
moves that redistribute income, tax burdens and priv-
ileges favoring the wealthy are becoming conspicuous.
A ‘rightwing-conservative’ orientation of redistribu-
tion is appearing in the measures of the tax reform.
That direction clearly appears in the uniform single-
rate tax system: the higher the taxed income, the larg-
er the gain to the taxpayer. Diverse family benefits
have a similar effect. It is especially worth observing
that a significant part of the state social security sup-
port is provided through tax concessions, so that
those in the weakest situation, with no taxable income
are excluded.
Redistribution includes distribution of gains and loss-
es, advantages and disadvantages between present and
future generations. Some people had naive hopes that
the new leadership, on taking power and wishing to
keep it for 15–20 years, apparently, might risk tempo-
rary unpopularity for the sake of future generations
and sustainable growth. But there is no sign of that.
The old routine continues: immediate problems are
being solved, but otherwise there is an attitude of
‘crossing that bridge when we come to it’. Do the
holes in the 2011 budget really have to be filled now?
Let us impose some taxes of astonishing magnitude
on those loathsome banks and multinational corpora-
tions, without thinking of what effect they will have
on the payers’ propensity to invest or the future eco-
nomic situation. Let us seize the assets of the private
pension funds, and take over the pension entitlements,
regardless of future costs to the state. Let us not
worry what will happen to the state pension fund in
the far future, when life expectancy is longer, the
active population even smaller, and the proportion of
the population entitled to a pension has grown. 
I could bring up some other examples, e.g. in con-
nection with infrastructural or environmental issues,
where the state economic policy is choosing to post-
pone measures due to be taken today and passing
them on to future generations, instead of seeking 
to spread the burdens proportionately among the 
generations.
Trust
It makes no sense to make sweeping statements
about trust, which is a complex social phenomenon
requiring detailed analysis. So far, no dramatic
change can be seen in the distribution of voters’
political trust. Few have left the segment of about
one-third of voters who gave Fidesz its present two-
thirds majority in the Parliament, although the latest
surveys have shown some wavering. My task here is
not one of political prediction. Historical experience
shows things going sometimes one way, sometimes
another. Sometimes a party’s support shrinks over
years, and sometimes it plummets abruptly. But a
party may sometimes remain politically popular for
a long time.
It is of great significance (though it has to be separat-
ed from voters’ political trust) how much the business
community trusts the state. To be honest, this type of
trust may be independent of whether the governing
form of the state in question is a democracy or an
extreme dictatorship, or some at intermediate level of
autocracy. Capitalism is a system that can function
amidst a dictatorship that flouts human rights. Indeed
it may prefer stable, strong-handed dictatorship to
unstable, weak-handed democracy, provided the for-
mer clearly supports private property, enforces con-
tracts, and guarantees security of rights. Capital wel-
comes an iron-handed regime like Singapore’s or com-
munist China’s.
What shakes the trust of the business world are ambi-
guities in government statements; if gaps in the bud-
get are filled by methods unviable even in the medium
term. However emphatically the government may
deny the significance of unfavorable credit ratings
from respectable credit-rating institutions, repeated
downgradings reflect a collective judgment from the
business world. And they are not simply a passive
reflection of an assessment, for they influence it in a
negative future direction.
In the short run, Hungary cannot exist without selling
its state bonds regularly. The downgrading of its reli-
ability as a debtor causes immediate losses in the hun-
dreds of billion forints, as the government is forced to
pay a higher yield if it wants to sell its bonds, whether
to Hungarian or international investors. Let me add,
the hundred-billion-forint losses are manageable,
however difficult. The real threat is that trust may not
just weaken, but collapse. The government should not
rage at those who warn them of this grave danger, but
reconsider what causes it. 
In the long run, the weakening trust of the business
community will slow growth, as I have emphasized
from another aspect earlier. That process cannot be
easily quantified, but the phenomenon can be per-
ceived. The investment climate of functioning enter-prises is deteriorating. There are fewer entrepreneurs
than would be in a more favorable business climate.
Foreign and domestic firms are pushing less hard. The
expansion drive is weaker and there is a stronger
temptation to invest their capital somewhere else.
Summary
What has been happening in the political sphere is
easy to summarize. Several important basic institu-
tions of democracy have been destroyed. Hungary has
become an autocracy. The Hungarian political regime
is threatening to resemble Putin’s. The direction of the
changes is clear: they are profound enough to be irre-
versible (or more optimistically, almost irreversible)
and guarantee (or more optimistically, almost guaran-
tee) the long-lasting rule of the group that has gained
power.
What has been going on in the economic sphere is less
easy to describe briefly, because it is full of mutually
contradictory actions, regulations impossible to
implement, and tendencies impossible to follow.
There is no clear direction in the new rules. Let us
hope that capitalism is a strong enough system to sur-
vive bad economic policy. It is indeed, but it charges a
high price for weaknesses.
In the political sphere, the Machiavellian aim (grasp-
ing power and retaining it for a long time) has been
attained in a masterful way. The plan was clear and
definite. Obstacles encountered have been removed
without delay or hesitation. As far as the economy is
concerned, I have not really been able to discern what
the aim is. It seems as if there may not have been any
detailed plans to implement. According to govern-
ment pronouncements, we may in a few months’ time
be informed of the plans for ‘structural reforms’, and
then be in a position to understand the aims of the
economic policy. But whatever the aims may be, they
have been bungled in their implementation.
We have every reason to be worried about the future
of this country.
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